Agency problems are an importaiit detertninant of ccrpatate cash holdings. For a sample of more than 11,000 firms fiibm 45 countries, we find that ccrporatioiis in countries where shaidiolders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corpontioiis in cotmtries with good shareholder protecticHi. ii addidoo, when shareholder protecti(Hi is poor, factns that genenlly drive Ihe need for cash holdings, stich as investment opportunities and asymmetric infcnnadco, actually became less inqxntaiiL These results are stronger after controlling for cqntal maiket development. Indeed, consistent with tbe impntance of agency costs, we find that finns hold lai^er cash balances when access to funds is easier. Otir evidence is consistent with the conjecture that investors in countries with poor shareholder protecdon cannot force tnanagers to disgorge excessive cash balances.
when shareholders have little protection since this transactions cost motive is not the primary determinant of cash hniriingg. Hiis interpretation implies that the relationship between investment opportunities and cash is strongest in countries with fewer agency isxiblems. Consistent with the latter interpretation, we find that the effect of the market-to-book ratio is much weaker in countries with few shardiolder rights.
The second test is rdated to the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) on finandal dependence and growth. They show that manufacturing firms from industrial sectors that need mare outside financing grow mare in countries with moie devdoped capital markets. We employ their measure of outside financing in our analysis af the determinants of cash holdings to further distinguish between the transaction cost and agency cost explanations of our findings. We find that firms in industries with more depeDdence on external finance have mare cash. Interestingly, this effiect weakens significantly in countries with poor shareholder protection. This lack of concern far external financing needs is further evidence af the agency motive far cash holdings. If firms simply hold cash because it is cosdiCT to raise outside financing when shardiolder protection is weak, we would have expected the inqxntance of financing needs to became stronger, not weaker.
Overall, the evidence in this pq>er indicates that shardiolder rights, and therefore agency costs, are important in determining corporate cash holdings throughout the world. There is little othra' systematic evidence on the determinants of corporate cash holdings outside the U.S. Rajan and Zingales (199S) present some descriptive statistics of cash holdings in the G-7 countries for 1991. What stands out in their data is that Jqianese firms had almost twice as much cash and equivalents in 1991 as the companies in the other countries. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) focus on the laige cash holdings in Japan. They argue that these holdings derive from the power exerted by the strong Japanese banks and they find that corporate cash holdings decline as bank power weakened over time. Love (2000) concentrates on the relation between a country's financial development and the investment cash flow sensitivity of its firms. Part of her research also analyzes the determinants of cash holdings internationally, but a shareholiter rights variable is not included in her analysis. She does find that firms hold more cash in countries with a lower level of financial market develcqmient Tlie remainder of this paper is organized as foUaws. Sectian n discusses the various determinants af corporate cash holdings in greater detail. Section m describes our data collection jnocedure. Section IV contains our results, and Section V concludes.
li. Corporate Cash Holdings and Corporate Governance
Opler et al. (1999) develop a useful firamewark for thinking about the determinants of cash holdings by firms. As mentioned previously, they discuss two views of cash holdings: the tradeoff model, which hypothesizes diat firms trade off various co8ts and benefits of debt finandng when they decide how much cash to keep and the financing hierarchy model, which suggests that cash balances are the outcome of firm profitability and finandng needs. We now discuss both views in more detail and the variables that can be employed as proxies to test these views.
A. The Tradeoff Model of Corporate Cash Holdings
We can identify two costs of holding cash and cash equivalents. If we assume that managers maximize shareholder wealth, the only cost of holding cash is the lower retum earned on it, relative to other investments of the same risk. This cost is often called the cost-of-carry: tbe difference between the retum on cash and the interest that would have to be paid to finance an additional dollar of cash. If we relax the assumption of shareholder wealth maximization, the costs of holding cash increase since managers now have the opportunity to engage in wasteful capital spending and acquisitions or, in some countries, outright theft Tbe benefits of holding cash balances stem from two motives. According to the transaction costs motive, firms hold more cash when the costs of raising it and the opportunity costs of short&lls are higher, llie current literature employs several variables to proxy for these costs. Given the substantial fixed costs involved in raising outside financing, small firms are likely to find it costiier to raise outside funds. In addition, there nuy be economies of scale in cash management, which also suggest that small firms hold more cash. Firms with better investment opportunities are expected to bold m(He cash because the opportunity cost of lost investment is larger for these companies; similariy, we expect firms with more volatile cash fiows to bold more cash to protect against the higher likelihood of cash shortfalls. The level of cqrital spencting, itself, should also be positively related with casb levels if it captures investment demands. In contrast, when cash fiows are higher, firms need to hold less cash to meet future investment needs. Finally, firms that pay dividends can always cut them to raise mme funds, and they are therefore expected to hold less cash. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) devel(^ a tradeoff model of optimal cash holdings. Many of the predictions that follow from their model are similar to those highlighted above. They also argue that optimal cash holHings are decreasing in the rate of retum on current investment opportunities.
The precautionary motive for holding cash is based on the impact of asymmetric infonnation on the ability to raise funds. In particular, even wben firms have access to capital markets to raise financing, they may not want to do so at a particular point in time because the securities they are plaiuiing to issue are under\'alued. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms can overcome this problem by building up financial slack, which they define as cash, cash equivalents, and unused risk-fiee borrowing capacity. Since firms with high R&D expenses are more opaque, the level of R&D to sales is a reasonable proxy for asymmetric information. We already employ the maiket-to-book ratio of the firm because it captures growth opportunities, which are important in the transactions cost motive. Of course, there is generally more uncertainty about the value of growth opportunities than about assets in place. As such, the maiket-to-book ratio can also be employed as a proxy for asymmetric information.
In a recent paper, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2002) focus on the importance of financial constraints in determining the optimal cash level. Finan-daily constrained firms cannot raise sufficient funds to finance all future expected investment needs and may decide to hoard cash today to fund future investment For unconstrained firms, cash holdings are irrelevant Because of this inelevance, Almeida et aL (2002) focus on the sensidvity of annual changes in cash holdings to cash fiows and not on cash levels. Consistent with their model, they find that this sensidvity is only posidve for constrained firms. The inelevance proposidon of Almeida et al. (2002) suggests that including unconstrained firms in an analysis of cash levels noay make the estimadon noisier. As mendoned previously, they also find that unconstrained finns with low managerial ownership build up cash when cash fiows are high, which is consistent with die agency motive, but not the precaudonary modve.
B. The Financing Hierarchy View of Corporate Cash Holdings
The financing hierarchy view suggests that dioe is no optimal level of cash, just as there is no optimal level of debt Cash balances are simply the outcome of the investment and financing decisions made by the firm as suggested by the pecking order theory of financing. Firms with high cash fiows pay dividends, pay ofF their debts, and accumulate cash. Firms with low cash flows draw down their cash and issue debt to finance investment, but diey refrain from issuing equity because it is too cosdy. Unfortunately, many of the variables that are correlated with cash fiows can also be employed as proxies in the tradeoff theory. The major difference betwe«i the two views is that the tradeofF theory predicts a posidve reladonship between investment (in capital expenditures and R&D) and cash levels, while the hierarchy view predicts a negadve sign. Addidonally, the hierarchy view sees debt and cash merely as opposite sides of the same coin.
C. Shareholder Protection and Cash Holdings
As discussed in Secdon n. A, the agency cost view of corporate cash holdings suggests diat managers who are less concemed with shareholder wealth hoard cash and invest it in negadve NPV projects or use it to overpay in acquisidons. Of course, simply holding too much cash destroys value because of the cost of cany. In addidon, if these cash holdings reduce the discipline imposed on management, corporate decision making may be affected, resulting in reduced firm earnings. One of the issues in the well-known 199S Chrysler case was not that holding onto cash was wasteful per se or that management would spend it on negadve NPV projects, but that management would not take much acdon in case the U.S, economy went into a recession. Management had basically informed shareholders that the $7.5 billion cash hoard would be needed (i.e., used up) to weather a recession. Consistent with this view, Opler et al. (1999) show that firms that move from high to low cash holdings are loss-making finns.
Overall, however, there is litde support for the agency cost modve because ownership structure and cash levels are not strongly related. An altemadve interpretadon of this evidence is that in the U.S. shareholders enjoy good legal protecdon and can thoefore force companies to disgorge the cash. LLSV (2(XX)) report evidence on dividend policy consistent with this interpretadon. lliey find that firms pay out more of their earnings in the form of dividends in countries with good legal protection for shareholders. We therefore take the question to international data and see whether cash holdings are highn in countries where shareholders have fewer rights. In addition, we study whether the variables that measure the transactions costs and precautionary motives for holding cash are less important when shareholder rights are weak. This is a corollary to the earlier tests: if cash holdings are partly the outcome of weak shareholder protection, the other determinants should be less impartanL An alternative explanation for high cash holdings in countries with weak shareholder protection is that firms simply hold more cash because capital markets are not receptive to new financing. This would make the precautionary and transactions costs motives for cash holdings more impartanL We examine this passibility in three ways. First, we determine whether the development of the equity and debt markets affects cash haldings ar whether these effects are dominated by shareholder protection. Second, we determine whether the importance of proxies for the precautionary and transactions costs motives is larger in countries with more shareholder protectian. Third, we analyze whether firms with greater need for outside finandng hold more cash and whether these holdings are affected by the level of shareholder protection.
There is also another interpretation of the relation between shareholder rights and cash holdings. We know from the work by LLSV that ownership is mare cancentrated in cauntries with few sharehalder rights. It is passible that controlling families force firms to hold more cash as a store of wealth because the taxes that need to be paid when taking the funds out are higher. To study the merits of this interpretation, we include dummies for family control and dividend taxation in some specifications.
lil. Data Coilection and Variabie Construction
We gather data from the Global Vantage database for 1998. The database contains financial information for 16,157 companies from 80 countries. To measure shareholders rights, we employ the shareholder rights measure devdoped by LLSV (1998). This is an index formed by adding one when each of six criteria relating to the extent to which minority sharehalders have a say in carpraate gavemance is met. LLSV construct this measure far 49 countries; firms from other cauntries are excluded from our analysis. Tiiese exduded countries are mainly current and farmer Carrununist countries and African countries. In addition, four cauntries far which LLSV have shareholder rights data are not included in Global Vantage: Ecuador, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay. Thus, corporations from 45 countries are included in this article.
We further remove the faUawing sets of firms from the sample: i) firms with operatians in financial services (SIC cades starting with 6); ii) firms that are cansidered governmental or quasi governmental (SIC codes starting with 9); iii) finns for which cash and equivalents and/ar assets are missing; and iv) firms that da not present consolidated finandal statements.^ The remaining sample consists of 11,591 campanies from 45 countries.
-The tnajcnity of the firms in each countiy report consolidated financial stattmeitts, except for India and South Korea. To see whether our results are affected when we eliminate countries in which We define the cash ratio as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets are computed as assets less cash and equivalents. The main reason for netting out cash from assets is that a firm's profitability is mainly related to assets in place and cash should be measured relative to this base. We also report robustness checks where we use the ratio of cash to sales.
Tible 1 presents a first look at the data. In this table, we divide the countries into two groups based on LLSV's shardiolder rights variable. Twenty-nine countries are in the high shareholder rights group (shareholder rights variable equal to three, four, or five) and 16 are in the low shareholder rights group (shardiolder rights variahle equal to zero, one, or two). The U.S., J^un, and the U.K. are the countries with the largest reiHesentation in the sample. Thcie is substantial variation in fiim size as measured by book value of assets. The median firm in Mexico has a book value of $1.16 billion, while the median firm in Pakistan has a book value of only $72 millioiL Our key ratio, cash to net assets, is displayed in the third column of Tkble 1. There is tremendous cross-country variation in this ratio. The overall median is 6.6%, but many countries have median cash to net assets of over 10%. Egypt with cash to net assets of 29.57% and Israel with cash to net assets of 20.93% stand ouL Japanese fimis have a median cash to net assets ratio of 15.49%, which is the highest of the countries with developed cfqrital markets. In fact, this ratio is twice as high as for the U.K. and more than double the level of the U.S. and Germany. Our figures for Germany, Japan, and the U.S. broadly correspond to those r^orted by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001).
Hnns in the high shareholder rights group have median cash to net assets of 6.30%, conqMired to 8.60% in countries with low shareholder rights, consistent with the view that firms hold more cash when shareholder protection is weak.F or example, the median U.S. firm is close in size to the median Swiss firm, but median U.S. cash holdings are only $ 19.5 million vs. $31.7 million in Switzerland (median cash holdings are not reported in the table).
T^\a 1 also reports country medians for some of the other variables employed in our analysis. We do not have the same number of observations fbr these variables because they are not available on Global Vantage or because they require data to be available for prior years. In addition to size, investment opportunities are important for both the transaction costs and the precautionary motive. The market-to-book ratio of the firm, computed as (market value equity + book value liabilities) / total assets is employed as a proxy for investment opportunities.N ote that the U.S. has the highest median maiket-to-book ratio of the countries many finns choose not to consolidate theiT financial statements, we apply the following {Hoccduie: we remove coontries when mote than x% of tiie finns do not consolidiitB, where x varies between 90% and 10%. We then ie-estimaie all r^iessiciis for each subset of coontdes. Oar findings penist for all cutofEs. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Gieece require their companies to pay out a certain fiaction of income as dividends, which may lower thne firms' cash balances; all our results continDe to hold when we coDtiol fat this minimnni payout leveL As expected, firms ficm countries with minimum payonts have lower cash hBlanrm.
*Wt have repeated all onr tests using a modified maiket-to-bodc ratio where we subtract cadi and cash equivalenls from both the numerator and the dencminaur of the ratio. Our results are virtually unchanged. The ccnelation between the original and modified maifcet-40-book ratio is 0.83 at die finn level.
with devdoped capital markets at 1.S1. We also report median book leverage, the ratio of net working capital to net assets, the ratio of cash flow to net assets, and the level of capital expenditures to net assets. Cash flow is defined as EBITDAintraest payments -taxes -dividends. Unlike fcv the U.S., capital expenditures data are not consistently available far most countries. We therefore proxy for capital spending by taking the difference in net fixed assets compared to tbe previous year and adding depredation. The ather variables induded in the nnain analysis but not reported in the table are: i) a dummy variable, equal to one if the firm pays a dividend and zero otherwise; and ii) the ratio of R&D expenses to sales as a measure of opaqueness.
We include leverage in some specifications to see whether firms simply finance additional cash holdings with more debt Hie ratio of net working c^tal to net assets is induded as a control variable. Net working capital is normally computed as current assets minus current liabilities, but we remove cash from the current assets corrqHitation. This ratio captures additional liquid assets held by the firm and our goal is to detennine whether this additional source of liquidity acts as a complement or substitute for cash and equivalents. All of the ratios included in the analysis show substantial variability across countries.
IV Results
This section contains the findings af our investigation of the determinants af cash holdings across the countries in our san^le. In subsection A, we present aur main results. Subsection B contains a number of additional tests, including an analysis at the country level and subsection C explores the relation b^ween cash holdings and interactions between shardioldn rights and firm characteristics.
A. Explaining Rrm Casii IHoldings
Ibble 2 contains the analysis of firm-level cash levels. We employ the log of the ratio of cash to net assets as the dependent variable (as do Qpler et al. (1999)). AU variables are winsodzed at their 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid problems with outliers. Significance levds are adjusted to refiect White's heteroskedastidty correction of the standard errors.
Modd (i) of l^le 2 contains a regression model with only the level of the shareholder rights variable and industry dummies, defined at the two-digit SIC code level, as explanatary variables. Consistent with the agency motive far cash holdings, the coefficient on shardiolder rights is negative and highly significant Tlie economic significance of the result is also substantial. Increasing sharehalder rights from ZEXO to five leads to a decrease in cash holdings of 18%.
As LLSV (1998) demonstrate, shareholder rights are correlated with the legal origin of a country, where the main distinction is between countries with a common law tradition vs. those with a dvil law traditiorL We investigate in column (ii) whether our results also hold when we include a common law dummy in the regression instead of the sharehalder rights levd. The caefGdent on the common law dummy is indeed negative and significant indicates that firms in common law countries hold 35% less cash than those in dvil law countries.
Our interpretation of the result in column (i) is that managers like to hold a lot of cash because it reduces pressures to perform and allows them to spend these funds on projects that increase their non-pecuniaiy benefits, but have a negative impact on shareholder wealth. There is an altemative interpretation for this result. however, which is much more benign. We know from LLSV (1997) that c^tal markets are not well developed in countries with poor shareholder protecdon. This implies that the transacdons costs of raising addidonal funds are higher, and firms may respond to this by holding higher cash balances. In regression (iii) of I^Ie 2, we include two measures of capital market development to investigate whether this altemadve interpretadon is more consistent with the data. The first measure is the rado of the external c^tal market to GNP and is discussed in greato: detail in LLSV (1997). This rado employs the stock market capitalizadon held by minority shareholders as the numerator. This may be a better measure of the size of capital markets than stock market c^-talizadon in countries where shareholdings are highly concentrated. The second measure captures the size of the credit market It is the rado of "private credit by deposit money banks and other financial insdtudons" to GDP. 'T\as measures the total amount of debt finance to private firms ftom all financial insdtudons, except central banks. We obtain this rado firom Levine, Loayza, and Beck (20(X)). After controlling for the development of the ct^tal market, we condnue to find that shareholder rights are important. In fact, the coefBcient on shareholder rights more than doubles reladve to model (i). In addidon, the sign on die size of the debt market is posidve and highly significant This result suggests that, if anything, firms hold more cash when c^tal markets are large, and does not support the view that cash haldings are driven by the inability af corporations to raise funds. Instead, the easier it is to raise funds, the more cash companies hold, which is supportive of the agency view. Of course, this interpretation of the r^ression is only partially supported, given the lack of significance ofthe coefQdent on equity market devdopment.
Madds (iv) through (vi) of Thble 2 repeat the previous analyses, but they include firm-specific characteristics in addition to the industry dummies to make sure that shareholder rights are not simply proxying for differences in firms across countries. If anything, the results are stronger after controlling for firm-spedfic characteristics. The coeffident on shareholder rights increases from -0.04 in modd (i) to -0.10 in model (iv) and from -0.11 in modd (Hi) to -0.18 in modd (vi). Based on modd (vi), moving from zero to five in the shareholder rights category reduces the level of cash and cash equivalents by 61%. Also note that many of the control variables are significant and have the expected sign. Tlius, controlling for industry alone is not sufficient to capture the dispersian in the cash ratias. Consistent with i»iar evidence, we find that firms with higher market-tobook ratios and higher levels of R&D expenses relative ta sales have higher cash haldings, which supports both the transactions costs and precautionary matives. We alsa find an important size effiect: larger firms hold less cash. Tliere is also a positive relation between cash haldings and cash fiows, which is consistent with both the tradeoff and finandng hierarehy models. Finally, the negative caeffident an the ratia af net walking capital ta net assets suggests that cash haldings and net working capital are substitutes. The other determinants of cash holdings are also important economically. For instance, increasing firm size from its 25th percentile ($92 million) to its 75th percentile ($985 million) reduces cash holdings by 13%, based on modd (vi); increasing the market-to-book ratio firom its 25th pocentile (0.96) to its 75th percentile (1.75), leads to an increase in cash holdings of 11%.
The model estimated in Table 2 is called the reduced farm madd, because we da not indude dividends, c^tal structure, or capital expenditures as explanatory variables. These variables are excluded because the tradeoff theory would argue that leverage, cash haldings, and investment palicy are jaintly determined. Hawever, in rabustness checks we verify that this amissian daes not drive our results. In addition, we do not indude industry cash fiow volatility in our models because the industry dummies c^ture this effect Finally, we do not indude a regulation dummy because regulation varies dramatically across countries.'
B. Additional Tests
In tfiis subsection, we perform a variety of tests to investigate whether our findings are rabusL In particular, we facus on four sets of issues: i) the lack of 'We have also rxtimati-d models using a firm's excess cash level relative to two "optimal cash" level benchmarks as the dq)endent variable. Bodi make use of U.S. data to determine what the basecase level of cash holdings should be, gmiming that a benchmark based on U.S. data provides a good indication of what cash levels should be when shareholder ri^ts are strong (see also Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) who use a similar approuh). The first benchmark is Ae median cash level in the same U.S. two-digit SIC code industry. To compute tbe second benchmark we estimate the reduced fonn cash r^ression model far U.S. firms and tise the estimated coeflBdents to predict cash levels for the other firms in our sample. All results using excess cash levels are consistent with those using the raw cash levels reported in the paper. independence of observations within a country and within an industiy; ii) construction of the variables: iii) omitted variables; and iv) robustness over time and across subsamples.
The regression models reported in Table 2 are estimated using OLS, which assumes independence of the observations. It is possible that there are interdependendes of observations within an industry and within a country, ib make sure that our findings persist after controlling for these interdependendes, we estimate a random e£Fects model with random effects for each country/industry pair. This allows for different industry effects per country, as well as for country effects. In fact, a Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis that the error terms are independent across countries and industries. Hie results of this analysis are reported in Table 3 , using the same structure as in T^Ie 2. The coeffident on shareholder rights remains highly significant in all models. It is somewhat smaller in absolute magnitude in the models that indude firm characteristics, but it remains economically importanL For example, based on regression (vi) of Tkble 3, moving from countries with high shareholder rights to countries with low shareholder rigî ncreases cash holdings by more than 80%, after controlling for industry and firm characteristics. The coe£Gcients on the other explanatory variables are also similar in magnitude and significance to those reported in Table 2 . An alternative way of dealing with the lack of independence af observations is to estimate regressions an countries' means. These findings are reported in Ikble 4.^ Regression (i) is the basic regression modd estimated previcHisly at the firm levd, but we now have only one observation per country, namdy the cauntiy average. Hie caeffident on the shardiolder rights variable is significant and similar in mngnitiiHp. to that estimated at the firm levd. However, these models have no industry controls. This problem is remedied in modd (ii) v/bexe we first adjust aU firm-levd variables by their two-digit SIC code industry average, prior to the computation of the country mean. Again, we find that the shareholder rigjits variable is significantiy negative. The next set of robustness tests, reported in panel A of Ikble S, focuses on the construction of both the dependent and explanatory variables. In model (i), we divide countries into two groups based on shareholder rights, where countries with high shareholder rigjbts have a shareholder rights index of three and higher. This shareholder rights dummy is employed as the explanatory variable instead of the rights level. We continue to find that firms in countries with better shareholder protection hold more cash. In model (ii), we employ the ratia af cash ta sales as the dependent variable instead af cash to net assets. While we use net 'Oreen (1993) aigues that esdmating OLS at tbe group means level could lead to heten>skedastic-ity: we tfaetefbie lepcnt p-vahies baaed on Wbite-adjusted gtandoid emxs. assets to defiate cash levels to mninmin consistency with odier studies, thoe are substantial cross-country differences in accounting conservatism, which may affect book assets (see, for example. Flower and Ebbers (2002)). Sales figures are less likely to be affected by conservatism than assets, which justifies employing a sales defiator. The coefficient on shareholder rights remains negative and significant in this specification, and it is actually laiger than in the base case where cash holdings are divided by net assets. In column (iii), panel A of T^le S, we use the shareholder rights dummy while scaling cash by sales. If anything, the shareholder rights variable becomes more important in explaining cash levels. In column (iv), we use sales to deflate the level of cash as well as all the independent variables, wi± similar results.
We are also worried that the maiket-to-book ratio is not a good proxy for investment opportunities for two reasons. First, the market-to-book ratio captures both die value of investment opportunities together with the probability that the firm will take them, and this probability may vary across countries. Second, the market-to-book ratio is also afFected by differences in the measurement of book assets across countries. We therefore use past sales growth as a In panel B of Tkble S, we investigate whether our findings persist after controlling for a number of other potential determinants of corporate cash holdings. In model (i), we include the variables excluded from the reduced form model: leverage, a dividend dummy, and the level of capital expenditures, albeit that these variables are likely to be endogenous. Even after controUing for these effects, we continue to find that firms hold lower cash balances in countries where shareholders are not as well protected.^ The inclusion of capital expenditures also mitigates another concem: it is possible that the explanatory variables are measured with different errors across countries; this could be particularly troubling for R&D, because in some countries certain development expenditures need to be capitalized, while they are expensed in other countries (see Flower and Ebbers (2002)). Capitalized R&D expenses are accounted for as capital expenditures, which implies that our measure of opaqueness (R&D over sales) is biased. This bias may be correlated with shareholder rights because it is in countries with loŵ We also exaimne wbetfaer firnis are indifiereni between baving one more dollar of cash or one less doIlHT of debL The specification estimated in TMe 2 employs the log of the cash ratio as the dependent variable, but the level of the leverage ratio as one of the egplannmry variables, and is theRfon not suited to examine this question. Using levels on both sides, we find the coefitdent on leverage is always significantly lai:^ than -1. Thus, the dedsioo between holding cash and paying off debt is not a matter of indifference.
TABLE 5 Robustness Tests of Pooled Cross-Country Regression
The dependent vartabia In modala (II), (HI), and (Iv) of panal Ala the kigarthm or oaah and aqulvalanta dMded by niea. Tlie dependant variable In an other modala la the logwithm of caah and equlvalenia divided by net aaaets. fM Aaeeta are total aaaeta mlnua cash and eqiivalanta. Tha Sharehoklar RH^ (lenl) variable goes from zaro k> fh«. TTie Sharahokiar raghm (dumnv) variabia la a dumrry variable equal to one If iharahoktor rlg^tB ara high, and zero otherwiae. Extemal CapHallatheatockmarkstcapltallzatkinhaldbymkiorftyaharahokiera. Private Credit la the cradt pcavkled by dapoalt money bania and athar financial hatltutkina to non-govarnmant owned nrrria. MarksMo^Book la the rnarkat valua of eqiity plua the book value of llebHea (Mded by the book value cf total aaaelB. Salea Growth ia computed aa tha average aalea I^owth ever the pravkua five yeera or however many yeera are avalable on Qk:balUBnlaga. Size la the kig cf the book vakie of Mai aeaeti In $U.S., except whan aelea are eirpkved aa the deflator In whk^ caae aize la the log of aalea In $U.S. NWC la current aeeata mhua cirant llatillitlee mhua caah and aqiivalanta. Tlie dvklend duriny la equal to cne IfthefkinpayaadMdandandzaroothenriae. Caali Fkiw la operathg Income plua deprecUkxi and amortlzatkvi mlnua intereatmkxataxeamlnuecMdande. Leverage la rtnrt-tBrm plua long^erm debt dvklad by the bock value of total aaasta. ICMPX la the y8ar.<»7aar change h net fixad aaaeta pkja dapreolatkxi. Al reirenlcna Iriclude hduatry durmy vvlablaa. shareholder rights that firms have more fieedom in deciding whether to capitalize R&D expenses. However, the coefficient on coital expenditures is actually negative and significant, while the ratio of R&D to sales continues to have a positive effect on cash holdings.
We know from the work by LLSV (2000) that fimis pay lower dividends in countries with little shareholder protection. Our finding indicates that these firms also hold more cash. Are these really independent results or are the cash holdings simply a consequence of the lower payout level? To investigate this possibility, we include the ratio of dividends to sales as an additional explanatory variable.^ Column (ii), panel B of Tbble 5 contains the result Shardiolder rights remain important, which indicates that our finding is not merely a consequence of the evidraice presented by LLSV on the relation between shareholder rights and dividends. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the dividend-to-sales ratio is actually positive and significant The economic significance of this finding is quite small, however increasing the ratio of dividends to sales from its 2Sth percentile (0) to its 7Sth percentile (0.0147) increases cash holdings by 3.5% only.
In model (iii), panel B of T6ble 5, we control fbr the risk of expropriation, which is the risk of confiscation or forced nationalization as tabulated by LLSV (1998); lower scores represent a higher risk. We would expect lower cash balances in countries with a high risk of expropriation, because it may be easier to confiscate cash than other assets. The sign on expropriation is actually negative, however, which is inconsistent with the expropriation story. It tums out that the risk of expropriation is highly correlated with the measures of capital market development When we exclude the measures of capital market devdopment, the coeffident on expropriation is O.OS, with a p-value of 0.01, which is consistent with the above argument. The importance of shareholder ri^ts persists.
As mentioned ixeviously, it is possible that controlling families use their companies to store wealth because taking the funds out through dividends is too costly in terms of taxes. We create two dummy variables to study the merits of this explanation. The first dummy is equal to one when more than half of the largest coni^ranies in the country are faniily controlled, based on the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) Modds (iii) through (vii) in TEible S focus on subsamples. One concern about the firm-levd regressions is that the results are caused by observations from large countries. The regressions at the country level reported in Ikble 4 suggest that this is probably not the case, but we subject this concern to further scrutiny. In modd (iii), we estimate a wdghted least squares madel, where the weight of each observation is the inverse of the number af abservatians in each cauntry, sa that each country recdves equal wdght in the estimation. The impact of shareholder rights continues ta be significant in this modd. In model (iv), we exchide the U.S. and Japan, with similar results. La model (v), we examine dvil law countries in isolation to determine whether our finding is more about the legal origin of a country or its protection of shareholders. Model (vi) contains the results for OECD countries only. These are countries with more similar capital market development. The coefRdent on the shareholder riglhts dummy is still negative and significant in this spedfication. The regression indicates that the negative effect of shardiolder rights persists within the dvil law cauntry subset. Finally, madel (vii) shows that the findings also persist for G-7 countries.
We also examine whether our results hold for finandally canstrained firms, in light of Almdda et al.'s (2(X)2) argument that cash levels are irrdevant far unconstrained firms. When we laak at the subset of firms with zero dividends, assuming these firms are financially constrained, we continue to find that shareholder rights are significantiy negative (not reported in Tkble S).
We have also repeated aU models in Ikble S using country and industry random effects. The coefBdent on sharehalder rights continues to be significantly negative in all specifications.
C. Interactions between Firm Characteristics and Shareholder Rights
In the previous analysis, we assumed that the impact of firm characteristics on cash holdings is constant across countries. However, this does not need to be the case. In fact, the tradeoff theory af the determinants of corporate cash levels has iaq>lications for the effects of these variables across countries.
Let us first consider the transactions cost and precautionary motives. In our previaus discussion, we assumed that the cost of raising funds was constant except for a size effect: large corporations are assumed to be able to raise funds at a lower cost Hie expected variation in cash holdings therefore comes firom differences in the oppoitunity cost of lost investment. But there are substantial differences across countries in the costs of raising funds, as demonstrated by LLSV (1997) . This implies that firms should pay more attention to the opportunity cost variables in countries where raising funds is more difficult The agency witb poor sharebolder protection. Wbco we include the financial development variable constnicted by Love t'2002) in our legressioos, the magnitude and significance of the shaieholder rights variable are virtually unchanged. cost hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that the ease of raising money may actually lead firms to hold more cash when they have the ability to do so. ib examine the validity of diese arguments, we divide the countries into two groups acctading to the median ratio of external capital to GNP (cutoff is 0.25) and also in two groups according to the median ratio of private credit to GDP (cutofF is 0.64S). We then create dummy variables equal to one if a firm is in a country with well-developed equity/debt maikets. These dummies are then interacted with tiie two key variables used to capture q^xntunity costs and asymmetric information: tbe maiket-to-book ratio and the ratio of R&D to sales.
Column (i) of Ikble 6 contains the results of this enquiry. Note that we do not include capital market size itself, because the prior discussion indicates that its importance should only be relevant to the extent that it affects the magnitude of the other explanatory variables. The results are striking and not fiilly consistent with the transactions cost or precautionary motives for cash holdings. Hie coefficient on maiket-to-book itself is positive, but insignificanL The interaction with the laige equity market dummy is insignificant, but the interaction with the laige debt market dummy is positive and significant This result implies that the marketto-book ratio is more important in deciding how much casb to hold when debt markets are larger, which is more consistent with an agency cost explanation: firms hold more cash when they have the ability to raise more funds. The results on the R&D interactions are insignificanL Thus, the cash holdings of more opaque films are not affected by the size of the capital market Note that shareholder rights continue to have a significant negative impact on a firm's holdings of cash and equivalents.
In column (ii) of Tkble 6, we interact market-to-book and R&D with a high shareholder rights dummy. The goal here is to determine whether, as predicted by the agency cost motive, managers care more about the variables tiiat affect cash holdings when shaidtolder rights are high. Our evidence provides some support for this conjecture. The noarket-to-book ratio has a significant impact on cash holdings in countries with low shardiolder rights, but its inopact is more substantial in countries with high sharehdlda: rights. Adding up the coefficient on market-to-book and its interaction with the high shareholder rights dummy, we find a coefficient of 0.14, widi a/^vahie of 0.00. ib interpret this effect, moving from the 2Sth percentile of the market-to-book ratio (0.96) to the 7Sth percentile (I.7S), increases cash holdings by about 6% in countries with low shareholder protection and by 12% in countries with high shareholder protection. Thus, managers in countries where shareholders have few rights appear to take into account other fact(H^ when considering how much cash to hold. Regarding R&D, we do not find that the impact of the R&D to sales ratio on casb holdings depends on the level of shareholder protection.'' "An altemative way of analyzing this issue is to estimate regressions on a coantty-by-countty basis and tqioit average coefBcients on the shareholder rights variables by country. The problem with this estimation is tiiat many countries have relatively few data points. If we estimate a model with five explanatoty variables plus (up tt>) 66 industry riiimmipn for each countiy, we obviously lose a lot of countries/observations. For examide, if we limit ourselves to countries with at least 75 observations, we are left with 21 countries. For this sample, the average coeflRdent on the market-to-book ratio for countries with high shareholder rights is 0.11, while the avenge coefBdent for countries with low shareholder rights is 0.08. The p-value of a difference test is only 030, however. Tb make sure that shareholder rights do not proxy for capital market development, model (iii) combines the interacdons of models (i) and (ii). The impact of shareholder rights on the effect of the market-to-book rado persists in this regression. In addidon, the interacdon between the R&D to sales rado and die shareholder rights dummy is also posidve, which implies that opaqueness is a more important determinant of cash holdings in countries with good shareholder protecdon.
The last two columns of Ikble 6 contain the results of our final test on the importance of shareholder rights in different insdtudonal settings. In previous tests, we included the market-to-book rado to capture investment opportunides. We now consider a more direct measure of the need for extemal financing, which is a measure of an industry's dependence on external financing developed by Ra-jan and Zingales (1998). For their study of the impact of finandal development on growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) compute such a measure using U.S. data, based on the view that capital markets are relatively frictionless in the U.S. We employ this data item for two purposes. First, we examine whether firms with greater finandng needs hold more cash. One may argue that this variable better captures the transactions cost motive than the market-to-bo6k ratio since it focuses exclusively on financing needs, and nat investment appratunities. Secand, we interact financing needs with our high shareholder rights dummy to determine whether firms care more about finandng needs when shareholder rights are strong.
The regression in column (iv) of Table 6 contains the need variable but not the interactian; as expected, firms hald more cash when they operate in industries with higher needs for extemal finandng. Nate that we have fewer abservatians in this modd because Rajan and Zingales (1998) compute the need variable for manufEicturing firms only. In column (v), we interact the need variable with a high shareholder rights dummy. Hie need variable is no longer significant in this model; only the interactian term is relevant Thus, firms hald mare cash when the need for external finandng is greater only in countries where shareholders enjoy good pratectian. Hns supports the agency costs hypothesis: in countries where shareholders are not well protected, firms hold cash far ather reasons; in countries where they are well protected, firms care more about the transactions cost motive.
V. Conclusion
When managers dedde how much cash to hold in the firm, da they care only about shareholder wealth or about their personal well being as wdl? Our evidence indicates the latter agency problems are of primary importance in determining cash haldings. Using data on more than 11,000 companies firom 45 cauntries, we find significantiy higher cash holdings in cauntries where sharehalders enjay little pratectian. Moreover, the other determinants of cash holdings appear to be less important in such countries. None of the evidence points to managers holding more cash simply because it is more difficult to access capital markets in countries with poor shardiolder protection. If anything, firms hold more cash when it is easier to raise funds. These results remain after controlling for dividend payments, which indicates that our findings are not simply a consequence of LLSV's evidence that dividend payments are lower in countries with low shareholder protection.
We have performed a battery of robustness checks to reduce the possibility that our results are caused by measurement problems due to international differences in accounting data. Nevertheless, it is not passible across a large set of cauntries ta capture the subtieties af diffiErences in the accaunting treatment af many af the variables we employ. This is clearly a caveat of this study What we did not investigate in this paper are the consequences of having "excess cash." The evidence by Harford (1999) suggests that, even in the U.S., where shardialders are well pratected, managers with "taa much" cash an their hands waste it an paor acquisitions. Opler et al. (1999) find less evidence that excess cash gets wasted, but this may be because this is less likdy to happen in the U.S. Nevertheless, they do find that firms with large amounts of excess cash appear to lose more money in the future. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) , on the other hand, find that the operating perfonnance of firms with large cash holdings does not differ from that of a size-and industry-matched control sample. However, they focus on firms who hold their cash balances for at least five years. By definition, these firms have not wasted the resources. Investigating the consequences of high cash holdings in an international setting is clearly an important area of future researeh.
